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EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT—CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF A PERCEPTION GAP 
BETWEEN HOME AND ABROAD ON THE ANTI-
MONOPOLY ACT ENFORCEMENT  
IN JAPAN† 
MAKOTO KURITA* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A striking contrast exists between the perception of domestic and foreign 
parties concerning the enforcement of Japan’s Anti-Monopoly Act (“AMA”). 
In Japan, the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (“JFTC”), which is the 
enforcement agency of the AMA, is expected to act as a guardian of justice 
and a friend of the economically weak. Its efforts to maintain free and fair 
competition with limited power and resources have been praised to some 
extent. Those in business circles frequently complain that AMA enforcement 
is too stringent for them to improve international competitiveness. In 
contrast, from abroad the JFTC has long been seen as a “watchdog . . . 
trained not to bite.”1 Foreign firms and governments frequently allege that 
because of the AMA’s lax enforcement, cartels and exclusionary practices 
are prevalent in Japanese markets. Foreigners say that their market access has 
been significantly impeded by these practices and various closed business 
groups.2 They have requested that Japan take various measures to promote 
imports for specific goods and services, as well as measures against cartels 
 
 
 † All Japanese language sources were verified by Global Studies. 
 * Professor, Faculty of Law and Economics, Chiba University, Japan. This is the modified 
version of a paper presented at the International Conference on Competition Policy and Economic 
Development, organized by Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing, 
September 17-20, 2002). 
 1. Japanese Antitrust Enforcement: Up, Fido, Up, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1989, at 80. 
 2. Professor Haley argues that if cartels flourished in Japanese markets, foreign producers 
would have a competitive advantage to enter the market, because higher prices provide foreign 
companies with higher profits and incentives to penetrate. He goes on to argue that the improved 
enforcement of the AMA would provide disincentives to foreign producers to enter Japanese markets. 
John O. Haley, Weak Law, Strong Competition, and Trade Barriers: Competitiveness as a 
Disincentive to Foreign Entry into Japanese Markets, in JAPAN’S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT 
CHANGE? 203 (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990). Such an argument, however persuasive, seems to be 
neither prevalent nor popular abroad. This paper focuses on the contrast between foreign and domestic 
views; therefore this argument is omitted. 
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and exclusionary practices. In response, the JFTC made various efforts to 
strengthen the AMA and to improve its enforcement.3 
In this Essay, I will explain the causes of the perception gap between 
home and abroad regarding the JFTC’s enforcement activities,4 analyze the 
JFTC’s informal style of AMA enforcement, and make modest proposals to 
narrow the perception gap.5 In Part II, I will briefly present “typical” views 
from both domestic and foreign sources concerning AMA enforcement and 
the JFTC’s responses to foreign views. In Part III, I will examine domestic 
and foreign causes of the contrast, and identify the JFTC’s informal 
enforcement style as an underlying feature. Finally, in Section IV I will make 
some modest proposals for improving both foreign perceptions and the 
effectiveness of AMA enforcement, and I will provide suggestions for 
developing Chinese competition law.  
II. TYPICAL VIEWS ON THE AMA ENFORCEMENT BY THE JFTC 
The following summarizes the contrast between perceptions at home and 
abroad on the enforcement of the AMA by the JFTC6 and then describes the 
JFTC’s response to the foreign parties’ allegations. 
A. Domestic Views: The AMA as an Obstacle to Business Activities 
In Japan, few, if any, doubt that the AMA and its enforcement efforts are 
world-class and certainly comparable to those of other major jurisdictions. 
However, concerned industrial circles and ministries have echoed complaints 
about the JFTC’s interpretations of the AMA, suggesting that the JFTC’s 
guidance hinders trade associations and companies from implementing 
mutually beneficial activities for the purpose of preserving the environment 
and promoting recycling. There are also complaints that the JFTC’s 
 
 
 3. The governments of Japan and the United States have held continuous dialogues on structural 
economic policy issues since the end of the 1980s, named the Structural Impediments Initiative (“SII”) 
and the Economic Framework Talks. Competition policy, including AMA enforcement, is one of the 
major subjects involved in the process.  
 4. In this Essay, I use the term “enforcement” to mean all activities by a competition agency for 
the purpose of accomplishing the goals of competition law. Therefore, I focus solely on government 
enforcement. Besides government enforcement, private enforcement is vitally important for the 
purpose of compensating victims and effectively deterring offences. The United States is currently the 
only jurisdiction where private enforcement is actively utilized (and allegedly misused) for these 
purposes. 
 5. I also focus on the source of the perception gap between home and abroad on the JFTC’s 
enforcement activities and do not directly examine the substantive standards and criteria of the AMA 
violations and enforcement records of the JFTC. 
 6. I omit citations of various views from both sides. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/11
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quantitative standards and criteria on merger regulations, primarily based on 
market share figures, are too stringent and applied without due respect for 
actual competitive conditions in the relevant markets. The result of the 
JFTC’s interpretation allegedly troubles companies that are planning and 
implementing the restructuring of their businesses. These complaints, 
however, rarely surface as legal disputes with the JFTC because, as will be 
discussed later,7 the JFTC rarely takes legal action to remedy alleged AMA 
violations; the exception is perhaps hard-core cartels. 
B. Foreign Views: Market Closed by Exclusionary Practices and Lax 
Enforcement of the AMA 
The typical view from abroad regarding Japanese markets and the AMA 
is best exemplified by various reports published by the United States Trade 
Representative, including the annual National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers.8 The view is as follows: Japanese markets are closed 
to foreign firms, and competitive goods and services from abroad are thereby 
excluded from the second largest economy in the world. The most egregious 
barriers are anticompetitive or exclusionary practices by domestic firms, and 
Japanese governmental ministries and bureaus have been tolerating and even 
encouraging these practices. The JFTC has a long history of failing to 
enforce the AMA against such practices. For the purposes of further 
discussion this view will be referred to as the “closed Japanese market” 
theory.9  
The closed Japanese market theory peaked during the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (“SII”) talks, which addressed structural issues in both 
the Japanese and the United States economies.10 Of the six broad areas 
addressed by the Japanese side in the Final Report of the SII, four 
(distribution systems, exclusionary business practices, keiretsu relationships, 
and pricing mechanisms) related to the AMA and competition policy.11 Soon 
 
 
 7. See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
 8. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Access to Japan’s Photographic 
Film and Paper Market: Report on Japan’s Implementation of Its WTO Representation (Aug. 19, 
1998), available at http://www.ustr.gov/html/act301.htm#301_99 (text on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV.). 
 9. As to specific allegations by foreign firms based on the closed Japanese market theory, see, 
e.g., MASAAKI KOTABE & KENT W. WHEILER, ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN JAPAN: THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS (1996).  
 10. Structural Impediments Initiative Joint Report, June 28, 1990, U.S.-Japan, at 
http://170.110.214.18/tcc/data/commerce_html/TCC.Documents/Japan_Structural_Impediments_Initia
tive.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). 
 11. Id. 
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after the SII, the Film Dispute between the United States and Japan arose 
when one company’s complaint regarding the Japanese film market 
developed into one of the most serious conflicts between the two 
governments and one of the most difficult legal battles of the panel 
proceeding at the World Trade Organization (WTO).12 
C. JFTC Response: Role of the AMA and Vigorous Enforcement by the 
JFTC 
From the JFTC’s perspective, cartels and unfair trade practices are 
prohibited under the AMA. The JFTC has vigorously enforced these AMA 
regulations, issuing cease-and-desist orders13 and imposing heavy 
surcharges.14 Since the 1980s, when economic frictions with major trading 
partners, particularly those with the United States, intensified, the JFTC has 
made efforts to strengthen the AMA. These efforts include the investigation 
of import-restriction cartels15 and the surveillance of distribution and 
business practices in various industries.16 
Until the middle of 1990s, the JFTC gained confidence in the AMA and 
its AMA enforcement measures. The JFTC argued against the allegations of 
the closed Japanese market theory by highlighting its improved enforcement 
record. The JFTC’s response to foreign views was eloquently presented in a 
speech delivered in 2000 by then-Commissioner Itoda. The speech was 
provocatively entitled “JFTC Barks.”17 The speech summarizes the JFTC’s 
 
 
 12. Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO, U.N. Doc. 
WT/DS44/R (1998). Although the WTO Panel decision was in favor of Japan, the dispute and the 
JFTC’s response to it revealed some problems with the JFTC’s enforcement style. See infra note 41 
and accompanying text. As to the views from the United States perspective on the Film Dispute, see, 
e.g., Donald I. Baker & W. Todd Miller, Antitrust Enforcement and Nonenforcement as a Barrier to 
Imports—With Illustrations from the Japanese Film Dispute, 24 EMPIRICA 83 (1997). 
 13. For example, the JFTC rendered cease-and-desist orders to cement manufactures for their 
price-fixing cartels and imposed surcharges of more than 11 billion Yen. JFTC Recommendation 
Decision, 37 SHINKETSUSYU 58 (Jan. 25, 1991). 
 14. The surcharge system is a monetary measure imposed by the JFTC to disgorge profits gained 
by illegal price-related cartels. The amount of surcharge is calculated by a mechanical formula, 
specifically by multiplying each firm’s sales of goods or services from the cartel by a fixed percentage 
(six percent in principle). 
 15. The soda ash import cartel case (JFTC Recommendation Decision, March 31, 1983) was the 
most important at the time. 
 16. On the development of the AMA and its enforcement during the process of the SII, see 
Makoto Kurita, Recent Development of Competition Policy in Japan and Their Implications for 
International Harmonization of Competition Laws, in INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF 
COMPETITION LAWS 361 (C. J. Cheng et. al. eds., 1995). 
 17. Commissioner Shogo Itoda, Japan Fair Trade Commission Barks: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow: Competition Policy of Japan, Address Before the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Feb. 22, 2000), at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/speech/00-0222.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003). See 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/11
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activities during the 1990s and explains the revolutionary changes that the 
AMA and the JFTC implemented.18 
The JFTC also solicited foreign complaints on exclusionary practices and 
promised to address such complaints, if warranted. From the JFTC’s 
standpoint, however, most of the foreign complaints were abstract, baseless, 
exaggerated, or obsolete, and rarely conducive to actual enforcement 
activities.  
The JFTC’s efforts to strengthen the AMA enforcement attracted 
favorable attention from Professor First in the middle of 1990s.19 According 
to First, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the JFTC’s enforcement of 
administrative fines was improving and becoming roughly comparable to 
that of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). This observation 
was true at least as far as anti-cartel enforcement by governments was 
concerned.20 First’s view was based on the comparison between the total 
amount of administrative surcharges imposed by the JFTC and that of the 
criminal fines obtained by the DOJ. Since the late 1990s, however, the DOJ 
has drastically strengthened its enforcement activities against international 
cartels, imposing huge criminal fines and long prison terms.21 The 
Commission of the European Community (“EC Commission”) has followed 
the DOJ’s lead, although not by means of the criminal law.22 The JFTC, 
however, issued “warnings,” or informal instructions not to repeat the 
offense, only to Japanese participants in international cartel cases.23 The 
 
 
also Syogo Itoda, Competition Policy of Japan and Its Global Implementation, in COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES FROM THE E.U., JAPAN, AND THE USA 61 
(Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita eds., 2002). 
 18. Descriptions in Commissioner Itoda’s speech on the JFTC’s activities without distinguishing 
formal and informal measures may lead to misunderstandings by its readers. See also James D. Fry, 
Struggling to Teethe: Japan’s Antitrust Enforcement Regime, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 825, 825 
(2001). (“to rebut[ting] Commissioner Itoda’s above assertion”). 
 19. Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137 (1995). 
 20. Id. at 160. 
 21. The DOJ obtained a guilty plea and 500 million US dollars incriminal fines from F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant, for leading a worldwide conspiracy to raise and 
fix prices and allocate market shares for certain vitamins. See Press Release, United States Department 
of Justice, F. Hoffman-La Roche and BASF Agree to Pay Record Criminal Fines for Participating in 
International Vitamin Cartel, (May 20, 1999), (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.), 
available at http://www.USdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). 
 22. The EC Commission imposed an administrative fine of 462 million Euros on F. Hoffmann-
La Roche. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Imposes Fines on Vitamin Cartels, 
(Nov. 21, 2001) (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/gvesten.ksh?p_action.gettx+=gt&doc+IP/p1/1625101AG (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2003). 
 23. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Warnings Against Dasichi Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd. and Eisai Co., Ltd. (Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.), available 
at http://www2.jif.tc.go.jp/e-page/press/2001/20010405vitamin.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). 
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outcomes of recent international cartel cases clearly demonstrate that 
Professor First’s 1995 evaluation concerning anti-cartel enforcement by 
governments is now out dated.24 Therefore, the JFTC must drastically review 
its anti-cartel enforcement mechanism, including sanctions against cartel 
participants under the AMA.25 
III. WHAT CAUSES THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HOME AND ABROAD? 
The background and causes of domestic and foreign parties’ contrasting 
perceptions of the enforcement of the AMA by the JFTC must be identified. 
This Section will point out reasons that foreign parties, particularly those 
from the United States, tend to blame the JFTC for the lax enforcement of the 
AMA. It will then show several reasons that the JFTC’s activities are and 
have been likely misunderstood by foreign parties. Based on these analyses 
and a focus on the enforcement style of the JFTC, this Section will identify 
the underlying cause of the perception gap. 
A. Causes from Foreign Origin 
Several reasons exist for foreign parties to blame the JFTC for lax 
enforcement of the AMA. 
1. Obsolete or Anecdotal Evidence 
Historically, the JFTC and its enforcement of the AMA have been 
inconsistent, and it is only since the 1990s that the JFTC has gained the 
support of political, bureaucratic, and industrial circles. No one can deny that 
exclusionary practices were prevalent when the ministries and the business 
community were eager to take countermeasures against import and capital 
liberalizations. Times, however, have changed, and the JFTC has become 
more vigilant in detecting AMA violations. Also, business practices have 
changed. If foreign complaints are based on obsolete or anecdotal evidence,26 
 
 
 24. It is fair to add that Professor First clearly pointed out serious deficiencies in other areas of 
the AMA enforcement. See First, supra note 19. 
 25. The JFTC-commissioned study group published its report on comprehensive review of the 
AMA enforcement systems. See Report of “Study Groups on Anti-Monopoly Act,” JFTC press release 
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/press/index03-2.html (text on file with 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.). 
 26. I have no intention of arguing that all foreign complaints are baseless. Obsolete evidence may 
reveal on-going violations, and anecdotal evidence may indicate structural misconduct. Competition 
agencies must analyze such evidence on its merits with imagination and zeal.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/11
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the JFTC might have many difficulties in initiating formal enforcement 
procedures.27  
2. Double Standard 
Whether intentional or not, a kind of “double standard” is sometimes 
employed in the arguments of foreign parties. Although anticompetitive 
practices are prohibited both in the AMA and in the antitrust laws of the 
United States, interpretations of these laws are quite flexible and change over 
time. In the United States, since the 1970s the so-called Chicago School has 
gradually gained support, and its economic rationale and criteria for antitrust 
violations have been adopted by both enforcement agencies and courts.28 
Roughly speaking, the Chicago School criteria tend to bring about weak 
enforcement of antitrust laws. For example, the Chicago School argues that 
vertical restraints (territorial or customer restrictions) are generally pro-
competitive or at least competitively neutral, and therefore they should be 
treated as per se legal, or at least, presumptively legal. Trade representatives 
and other proponents of the closed Japanese market theory often argue, albeit 
based on the old antitrust theories and cases that are neither effective nor 
prevalent at this moment, that anticompetitive vertical practices like 
exclusive dealing, which would be punished severely in the United States, 
are tolerated in Japan because of the JFTC’s weak enforcement of the AMA. 
Thus, these proponents argue for strict enforcement, based on a different 
standard, which is not even prevalent in their home country.29 
3. Conduct or Practice v. Situation 
Antitrust or AMA violations must be specific restrictive “practices,” as 
distinguished from restrictive “situations.” For example, under antitrust laws, 
exclusive dealing must be an arrangement between a supplier and its 
distributors not to deal in competing products. Similarly, under the AMA, 
exclusive dealing is a practice by a supplier dealing with its distributors on 
the condition that the distributors do not deal with competing products. On 
the other hand, a situation where distributors, based on their respective 
 
 
 27. In the Film Dispute, Kodak’s allegations against Fuji’s anticompetitive practices were based 
on incidents mostly in the 1960s and 1970s; thus it might be difficult to prove the current practices and 
situations. 
 28. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: 
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1981). 
 29. The Film Dispute is typical on this point as well. Fuji responded to Kodak’s allegations by 
criticizing Kodak for urging the U.S. Government to apply a double standard of market definition. 
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business judgment, deal with the products of a specific supplier is not a 
violation of the AMA or the antitrust laws. However restrictive or 
exclusionary such a situation is, it cannot be deemed a violation because 
there is no “practice.” Foreign complainants sometimes allege such a 
situation, but not a practice. Therefore, such allegations are meaningless in 
the context of an AMA violation.30 
4. Misunderstanding on Japanese Economy 
In the 1980s, Japanese-style management was praised and long-term 
transactional relationships (called keiretsu) were considered to be a source of 
competitive advantage for Japanese companies.31 Abroad, many believe that 
long-term transactions are prevalent in Japan, and that foreign firms are 
excluded from creating close business ties between and among Japanese 
firms. From an outsider’s perspective, a long-term transaction, however 
efficient for the parties concerned, is an insurmountable barrier to new entry. 
Once such an understanding on Japanese economy has become well known, 
it is very difficult to refute. It is, however, quite questionable how firmly and 
prevalently such business relationships between Japanese companies were 
maintained even in the 1980s,32 and such relationships may have changed 
after the burst of the bubble economy in the 1990s. 
5. Difficulties of Analysis  
Most of the exclusionary practices alleged by foreign parties are vertical 
in nature. The role and effect of vertical restraints as a barrier to international 
trade is quite difficult to analyze, and proponents of the closed Japanese 
market theory may have manipulated neutral analyses in their favor. As 
Professor Scherer writes, “Competition policy rules should not be added to 
the arsenal of international trade policies merely to rescue would-be national 
market entrants from their own marketing strategy errors and 
faintheartedness.”33 
 
 
 30. This does not mean that no problem exists in such a restrictive situation from a viewpoint of 
competition policy.  
 31. JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW JAPAN’S 
SECRET IN THE GLOBAL AUTO WARS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE WESTERN INDUSTRY 1 (1991). 
 32. Recently, Professors Miwa and Ramseyer energetically published articles on 
misunderstandings regarding Japanese keiretsu issues, and also published a book for the general 
public. YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, NIHONKEIZAI-RON NO GOKAI: KEIRETSU NO JUBAKU 
KARA NO KAIHO [MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF JAPANESE ECONOMY: EMANCIPATION FROM SPELLBIND 
OF “KEIRETSU”] (2001). 
 33. F. M. Scherer, Retail Distribution Channel Barriers to International Trade, 67 ANTITRUST L. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/11
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6. Requesting Affirmative Action by Japanese Government 
Private firms are likely to have a distaste for fierce competition. In order 
to secure their penetration Japanese markets, foreign firms may request so-
called “affirmative actions,” or more favorable treatment than is given to 
domestic firms, on the pretext that they have been unfairly excluded by the 
anticompetitive practices employed by domestic firms. A typical example 
may be the Semi-Conductor Arrangement in 1986, which allegedly 
guaranteed a twenty percent market share to foreign products in the Japanese 
semi-conductor market.34 During the Economic Framework Talks, the 
United States repeatedly argued for quantitative criteria to monitor market 
penetration of foreign goods and services into Japanese markets. Based on 
these arguments the United States representatives may have expected that the 
Japanese Government would take affirmative actions in response to their 
requests based on the closed market theory. 
B. Problems From the Japanese Side 
Now let’s turn to the causes of discontent from amongst the Japanese. 
This Section point out various deficiencies in the JFTC’s enforcement of the 
AMA.35 
1. Informal Measures 
The JFTC sometimes takes informal measures (“warnings”) in 
investigative cases of companies without resorting to formal actions (cease-
and desist orders). As the JFTC admits, an informal measure is a kind of 
administrative guidance, compliance with which depends on the respondent. 
The reasons for using the informal measures vary. An informal measure can 
save enforcement resources such as time and manpower and may be issued 
even in cases of insufficient evidence of the alleged violations. Also, 
newspaper coverage of the JFTC’s informal measures is very similar to that 
of formal actions. An informal measure, however, is legally insignificant 
from a foreign perspective. Suppose that the JFTC takes ten formal measures 
and ten informal measures. The JFTC counts twenty measures in total, but 
 
 
J. 77, 112 (1999). 
 34. CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES: HOW WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD 
65 (1988). 
 35. Some of these causes are recognizable not only in the context of AMA enforcement by the 
JFTC but also in general Japanese bureaucracy, and rectifying the causes may be all the more difficult. 
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foreign parties see only ten formal measures. This may be one of the 
perception gap between domestic and foreign observers.  
Resorting to more formal measures was one of the JFTC’s commitments 
in the SII. The JFTC has made efforts to issue formal orders against blatant 
cartels such as price-fixing and bid-rigging. However, as far as other types of 
practices are concerned, few formal measures have been taken. Instead, 
informal warnings and press releases have been issued.36 Major allegations 
against access barriers to Japanese markets for foreign parties stem from 
import-restricting arrangements and exclusionary practices by domestic 
firms. The JFTC’s enforcement record clearly shows that few formal 
measures have been taken to remedy such practices.37 
2. Survey Method 
The JFTC has frequently conducted surveys of the various industries or 
practices based on the AMA and competition policy. The JFTC has surveyed 
the auto, auto parts, paper, flat glass, color film, and insurance industries. The 
United States has alleged that these industries maintain exclusionary 
practices in distribution channels. The JFTC surveys are not an investigative 
procedure against specific companies, but rather are a general fact-finding 
process conducted on an industry-by-industry, or product-by-product basis. 
From the JFTC perspective, such a method can be quite effective because of 
its extensive nature and low cost. For example, industry-wide research can be 
conducted, instead of company-specific and resource-extensive investigation. 
Additionally, not only the AMA violations, but also inappropriate practices 
can be identified and rectified, if necessary, through the JFTC’s 
administrative guidance. When a complaint is received regarding an alleged 
violation, the JFTC is not obliged under the AMA to open investigation into 
specific companies. Instead, the JFTC may conduct industry surveys not only 
under the AMA, but also on the basis of broader competition policy. A 
 
 
 36. A typical example is the Microsoft case in Japan. In 1998 the JFTC issued a warning against 
Microsoft (United States), in addition to taking formal measures against Microsoft (Japan) for illegal 
tying and alleged exclusive dealing in Japan with internet service providers concerning its Internet 
Explorer, which was also one of the allegations by the DOJ in the United States. Press Release, Japan 
Fair Trade Commission, A Recommendation and Warnings to Microsoft Co., Ltd. and Microsoft 
Corporation, (Nov. 20, 1998), (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.), available at 
http://www2.jftc.go/jp/e-page/press/1998/19981120.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). Microsoft 
reportedly issued its own statement that the JFTC investigation had found no violation of the AMA on 
its alleged exclusive dealing. 
 37. Out of 147 formal orders issued by the JFTC during the last 5 years (FY1998-2002), 108 
orders were bid-rigging cases and 8 were price-fixing cases. See HEISEI 14 NENDO KOSEI TORIHIKI 
IINKAI NENJI HOUKOKU 41 [2002 JFTC ANNUAL REPORT], Oct. 7, 2003. 
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survey is usually conducted by requesting voluntary cooperation from the 
parties involved.38 The JFTC’s findings and administrative guidance are not 
legally binding, although any adverse publicity generated by the findings 
may bring about voluntary compliance. The survey method, if improperly 
employed in such cases where investigation is warranted, may lack 
effectiveness and transparency. Foreign companies, however, have alleged 
that the JFTC is reluctant to initiate formal investigations into local Japanese 
companies. 
During the Film Dispute, Kodak alleged that Fuji violated the AMA. The 
JFTC conducted extensive surveys on the color film industry,39 and requested 
that Fuji adopt new measures.40 While Kodak reportedly filed a complaint 
with the JFTC concerning Fuji’s alleged AMA violations, no press release 
was issued on this matter. 
3. Guidelines 
The JFTC publishes various kinds of enforcement guidelines, including 
those for industries, which describe the JFTC’s interpretations and AMA 
enforcement policy. These guidelines, however, by their nature, are 
sometimes too abstract to enable the parties to find answers to specific 
competition problems, and are also too “conservative” for business circles to 
utilize. The meaning of “conservative” is as follows: The JFTC officials tend 
to be so afraid of committing Type II errors (under-enforcement) that they 
instead find no problem in a business plan that in reality is problematic under 
the AMA. The JFTC officials tend also to neglect the cost of committing 
Type I errors (over-enforcement) when it halts a business activity which is in 
fact competitively neutral or even pro-competitive. These tendencies make 
the JFTC’s guidelines conservative and quite broad in the already gray 
category of problematic practices. Furthermore, the framework for analyzing 
the competitive effect of problematic practices is not fully delineated in the 
JFTC guidelines. The guidance that the JFTC offered to requesting parties in 
accordance with such guidelines is quite cautious and vague. At times, the 
guidance only repeats the same language found in the guidelines. From the 
standpoint of foreign complainants alleging that specific practices fall under 
 
 
 38. While the JFTC may order any party to submit reports or data during its survey process, it 
usually requests voluntary cooperation. 
 39. Press Release, Survey of Transaction Among Firms Regarding Photographic Color Film for 
General Use and Photographic Color Paper, July 23, 2003, (on file with WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV.), availalbe at http://ww2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/press/1997/film1/film1.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 
2003). 
 40. Id. 
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the gray category of problematic practices in the AMA guidelines, the JFTC 
never initiated investigations. This result leads to the perception that the 
AMA and its guidelines may be adequate, but that the JFTC enforcement is 
inadequate. 
4. Informal Consultation Prior to “Prior Notification” of Mergers 
As is the case with competition laws in other jurisdictions, the AMA 
requires prior notification concerning mergers and acquisitions. As a formal 
procedure, the JFTC, upon receiving notification of a merger transaction, 
investigates the transaction and, if necessary, takes action. Parties to a large-
scale transaction in Japan usually approach the JFTC in advance of 
notification in order to consult informally with the organization concerning 
the transaction plan. The JFTC, after conducting hearings, fact-finding 
investigations, and examinations of the plan, then informs the parties of its 
conclusion as to whether the plan poses competitive problems under the 
AMA. The plan, if problematic, is to be modified or abandoned. The JFTC 
publishes its brief conclusions regarding major prior consultation cases. 
Business circles complain about the JFTC’s stringent attitudes towards 
mergers, although no formal action against mergers has occurred in over 
thirty years.41 The AMA adopted a prior notification and examination 
procedure in its original enactment in 1947, much earlier than the United 
States, which adopted pre-merger notification in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 
of 1976. These informal prior consultation processes that do not result in 
formal decisions have led to a misunderstanding on the part of foreign 
parties, who believe that the JFTC does not engage in merger enforcement 
under the AMA. 
Under the current practice of informal merger enforcement, merging 
companies that are likely simply to follow the JFTC’s conclusions or that 
engage in little legal counseling tend to modify or even abandon their plan 
pursuant to the JFTC’s initial response and without further examination. On 
the other hand, merging parties with much experience and ample legal 
counseling often try to persuade the JFTC to accept their original plan and 
may indeed actually obtain compromises from the JFTC. These compromises 
may be made by the JFTC without the necessary information regarding the 
transaction and relevant market conditions, because during the informal 
process the JFTC does not have the legal authority to obtain such 
information. In addition, the JFTC’s examinations in prior consultation cases 
 
 
 41. The recent legal case was Yawata-Fuji (Nippon Steel) merger case in 1969. JFTC Consent 
Decision, 16 SHINTETSUSYU 46 (Oct. 30, 1969). 
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can be quite lengthy, and some in business circles complain that the delay 
interferes with restructuring processes and business strategies. The current 
informal process of merger examination by the JFTC poses these kinds of 
serious procedural problems.42 
Regarding the substantive issues of merger enforcement, the JFTC 
promulgated its merger guidelines, which are quite different from those of its 
counterparts: the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
of the United States and the EC Commission of the European Union. The 
JFTC’s merger guidelines provide various factors to be examined, but do not 
provide the analytical methods and tools necessary for merger investigation. 
Those kinds of deficiencies may accrue from the under-development of 
analytical frameworks and legal doctrines as well as investigative tools and 
techniques in merger cases. These deficiencies also reflect the current 
practice of prior consultations on a confidential and informal basis.  
5. Ineffective Overseas Public Relations 
As is the usual case with Japanese institutions, including governmental 
agencies, the JFTC’s overseas public relations activities may be ineffective. 
The most difficult barrier may be language. If the JFTC provides no English 
language material on enforcement activities, many foreign parties may 
believe that no material means no enforcement activity. Informal measures, 
which are ambiguous even for domestic parties, are all the more difficult for 
foreign parties to understand. While the JFTC has an English language 
homepage43 that it updates daily and English brochures on the JFTC and the 
AMA, overseas public relations efforts must be intensified. The JFTC should 
adopt the positive attitudes of senior officials of foreign competition 
agencies, who actively participate in international conferences and symposia 
on competition law and policy, and more aggressively publicize their 
enforcement efforts. 
 
 
 42. The JFTC recently published and implemented new procedures for its prior consultations in 
order to expedite review process and to improve transparency. Press Release, Policies Dealing with 
Prior Consultation Regarding Enterprise Combination Plans, (Dec. 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/press/2002/december.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). The efficacy of 
such efforts has yet to be seen.  
 43. Japanese Fair Trade Commission, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page (last visited Oct. 
26, 2003). 
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C. Overall Assessment: Attention to Informal Enforcement Style of the 
JFTC 
The foreign parties’ perception of the JFTC, as a watchdog that does not 
bite, in this Author’s view accrues from the lack of visibility and 
transparency in the JFTC’s enforcement activities.44 As highlighted aboved, 
the JFTC employs various informal enforcement measures such as the survey 
method, the issuance of guidelines, and prior consultations on business plans, 
in addition to the formal enforcement procedures under the AMA.45  
Informal measures are frequently employed because of their significant 
advantages and merits. First, for the parties concerned, such measures are 
much more favorable than investigation. For example, anonymity in the 
informal process is of primary importance for respective companies. Second, 
for the JFTC, the informed measures conserve limited resources and budget. 
Third, such methods are often effective in addressing competition problems 
all over the industry in terms of both law and policy. 
Informal measures, however, may be seriously deficiencient for dealing 
with specific practices as well as in developing an effective regime of 
competition law enforcement. First, the JFTC may arrive at unaccountable 
conclusions during the informal process. Second, a double standard may 
arise between formal investigative cases and informal consultation cases or 
surveys. Third, informal measures may lack effective power to collect 
information and secure compliance. Fourth, the procedural rights of 
respondents may be jeopardized because of their inability to file protests with 
court. Fifth, the analytical framework and legal doctrines involved are under-
developed. Sixth, certain circumstances may not be foreseeable for the 
parties concerned. 
IV. MODEST PROPOSALS BOTH TO FOREIGN PARTIES AND THE JFTC AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHINESE COMPETITION LAW 
A. Proposals for Foreign Parties 
I would like to provide the following coveats to foreign parties, who 
criticize the JFTC’s enforcement of the AMA: 
 
 
 44. Professor Haley concentrates on informal measures in investigative proceedings. JOHN O. 
HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 1947-1998 115, 168 (2001). 
From a broader perspective, my analysis here covers informal measures out of investigative processes.  
 45. Id. 
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• Remember that competition law protects the competitive 
opportunity or process, not competitors. 
• Watch the actual conditions of Japanese economy carefully, 
without prejudice to stereo-typed images or superstitions. 
• Use the prevailing standards and criteria of competition laws to 
analyze the specific competition issues. 
• File complaints with the JFTC on specific practices, rather than on 
general allegations, and provide direct evidences. 
B. Proposals for the JFTC 
I also would like to offer the following suggestions to the JFTC to 
improve foreign perception of its enforcement of the AMA: 
 
• Conduct case investigations, not general surveys. The survey 
method may be effective, however, a survey cannot serve as a 
substitute for case investigation. Surveys and case investigations 
are mutually complementary. 
• Increase the number of formal measures based on the AMA, 
particularly vis-à-vis exclusionary practices. The JFTC’s 
enforcement record shows it has attempted to take formal actions 
against hard-core cartels. If warranted, formal actions must be 
taken against other types of practices. 
• Revise guidelines in order to narrow the gray areas and to provide 
analytical tools and methods. A prerequisite for promulgating 
effective guidelines is to take formal actions and to adjudicate 
cases. The JFTC can establish analytical methods, techniques, and 
criteria, and provide clear guidance to the business community by 
means of such cumulative efforts. 
• Respond as clearly as possible to prior consultations on specific 
business plans. In consultation cases, competitors’ collaborative 
activities, against which the JFTC would not have taken formal 
measures in case of investigations, might be halted because of the 
JFTC’s ambiguous responses. The JFTC must narrow the gap 
between the examination standards or criteria for investigation 
cases and those for consultation cases. 
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• Conduct formal investigations of merger cases in addition to just 
prior consultations. Although the current informal administration 
of merger cases may have significant merits for both the JFTC and 
merging parties, there are also serious disadvantages. Because of 
the long-standing informal treatment of mergers, the JFTC has yet 
to clearly establish doctrines concerning the competitive analysis 
of mergers. In addition, businesses lack legal certainty and 
foreseeablity, and the general public has little chance to review the 
JFTC’s conclusions on merger cases. 
• Improve overseas public relations activities. It would be 
particularly effective for the members and senior staff of the 
Commission to make presentations at international conferences 
and business gatherings. 
Roughly speaking, the substantive provisions of the AMA are similar to 
those of the United States antitrust laws. However, the procedural provisions 
and actual enforcement methods of the AMA are significantly different. It is 
neither practical nor desirable for the JFTC to flatly abandon all informal 
enforcement measures. It is necessary, however, to reduce the heavy 
dependence on informal measures by way of selecting optimal methods to 
address specific competition problems on a case-by-case basis. 
C. Suggestions for Chinese Competition Law Enforcement 
Most of the discussions regarding the draft Chinese competition law have 
focused on the substantive provisions as well as on the organization and 
independence of the enforcement agency. Instead, emphasis should be placed 
on procedural provisions and particularly on the practical ways and methods 
for a competent agency to address anticompetitive practices. To smoothly 
introduce new competition law and to secure compliance with it, a number of 
practical problems must be resolved.46 The issues include, but are not limited 
to: 
• The dissemination of regulations under competition law and the 
education of the bureaucracy, the business community, and the 
consuming public. 
 
 
 46. It might be useful to learn from the experiences of the United Kingdom, which adopted the 
EC-type competition law in 2000. The Office of Fair Trading, the enforcement agency of competition 
law, has made various efforts to disseminate the new law and to educate both the business community 
and consuming public, to provide guidance and prevent future violations, and to solicit information 
regarding alleged violations.  
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• The establishment of formal administrative procedures to enforce 
competition law, from case selection, investigation, and 
adjudication to final order and compliance. 
• The solicitation of information regarding alleged violations from 
various sources and a quick response to inquiries from informants. 
• The implementation of regulations providing for spot inspections, 
information-collection orders, interrogatories, expert witnesses, 
and the like. 
• The establishment of filing requirements regarding specific 
practices or activities, if warranted. 
• The promulgation of guidelines regarding specific practices and 
the establishment of prior consultation procedures. 
• The allocation of enforcement roles between formal investigative 
procedures and informal procedures such as survey, and the 
establishment of criteria on such allocation. 
In each jurisdiction, formal and informal enforcement measures should be 
mutually complementary, and they should share the burdens of 
accomplishing the goals of competition law. The measures should take into 
account various factors, including the acceptability of competition law in the 
business community, the reliance on the enforcement agency and its 
administrative procedures, and the available resources for the enforcement 
agency. The Chinese competition agency may learn some lessons from both 
the JFTC’s practices of informal AMA enforcement and foreign allegations 
against the JFTC. 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the last decade, gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, has helped and 
prompted the JFTC to improve its position inside the Japanese Government 
and to strengthen the AMA and its enforcement.47 Ongoing forward, 
however, the JFTC has to further improve the AMA enforcement regime and 
actual enforcement activities, including the procurement of larger resources. 
In this Essay, I analyzed the JFTC’s style of the AMA enforcement and 
pointed out some deficiencies inherent in it.48 I also illuminated lessons for 
 
 
 47. See MICHAEL L. BEEMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION IN JAPAN: CHANGE 
AND CONTINUITY IN ANTI-MONOPOLY POLICY, 1973-1995 ch. 8 (2002). 
 48. I may have exaggerated too much the contrast between home and abroad regarding the 
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the future development of Chinese competition law that may be derived from 
the JFTC’s experiences. 
Japan, along with the EU and Canada, has proposed multilateral 
competition rules under the auspices of the WTO, and the Doha Ministerial 
Conference finally adopted “trade and competition” as one of the items on 
the agenda.49 While future development on this issue is presently unclear, the 
“core principles” of national competition law and policy are on the table in 
multilateral negotiations. Most of the proposed core principles are related to 
procedural matters, such as the transparency of rules and regulations, the 
removal of nationality-based discrimination between firms, and the provision 
of due process and recourse to judicial procedures.50 Informal enforcement 
measures employed by the JFTC may require scrutiny under such core 
principles as transparency and due process.51 
“Antitrust is one of the best examples of legal transplants and 
convergence.”52 This statement is true, so far as the substantive provisions of 
competition law are concerned. Procedures, however, take deep root in their 
respective national legal soils and cultures, and thus develop gradually. Each 
jurisdiction must devise the most suitable and effective procedures to 
accomplish the goals of competition law, both investigative and non-
investigative, against their own social and historical backgrounds. 
Transparency might be the only common denominator in such ever-lasting 
efforts. 
 
 
JFTC’s enforcement, and foreign perception of Japanese markets may be changing, partly because of 
the stagnant Japanese economy since the 1990s. The JFTC has also made significant efforts to improve 
transparency and effectiveness, including formal actions against several private monopolization cases 
in the 1990s. Such efforts by the JFTC must be intensified in such ways as I have suggested in this 
paper. 
 49. World Trade Organization Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO B.I.S.D., at 23-25, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min01_e/mindeal-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). 
 50. See, e.g., KEVIN C. KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
THE LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM Ch. 5 (2001).  
 51. Most of the JFTC enforcement issues are related to transparency and due process among core 
principles. National treatment, however, may also have significance. In fact, in the early 1990s, when 
the JFTC started reinvigorating its enforcement activities, some foreign parties groundlessly alleged 
that foreign firms might be the first targets of the JFTC.  
 52. HALEY, supra note 44, at 172. 
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